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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of threshold effects between public debt and economic growth 
in the Caribbean. The main finding is that there exists a threshold debt to gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratio of 55–56 percent. Moreover, the debt dynamics begin changing well before 
this threshold is reached. Specifically, at debt levels lower than 30 percent of GDP, increases in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio are associated with faster economic growth. However, as debt rises 
beyond 30 percent, the effects on economic growth diminishes rapidly and at debt levels 
reaching 55–56 percent of GDP, the growth impacts switch from positive to negative. Thus, 
beyond this threshold, debt becomes a drag on growth.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
During economic crises, developing countries tend to accumulate debt as the growth in 
expenditure levels exceeds that of revenues while capital inflows decline. The mid-2007 global 
economic crisis had an immense impact on economies throughout the world. With mounting debt 
service payments due to the inability to raise sufficient capital, the global financial crisis has 
resulted in serious debt management problems. The current Euro-crisis provides great evidence of 
the effect high debt levels can have on an economy. In the Caribbean, economic recovery has been 
sluggish because of strong linkages with the United States and Europe. High levels of public debt 
are also an issue facing the region, which have implications for fiscal sustainability and economic 
growth. The Caribbean, which has some of the world’s most indebted nations (as a share of GDP) 
accumulated debt from continuous periods of fiscal deficits since the mid-1990s.  
Allowing debt to grow too large can offset the positive impacts1 and lead to problems in the 
macro-economy, in particular depressing real GDP growth. With a debt-overhang, investors lower 
their expectations of returns in anticipation of higher taxes needed to repay the debt and may also 
refrain from investing given the uncertainties about what portion of the debt will actually be 
serviced with the countries’ own resources. Therefore, new domestic and foreign investment is 
discouraged, which slows down capital-stock accumulation. Output may also be constrained 
through lower growth in total factor productivity. Governments may be less willing to undertake 
difficult and costly policy reforms as this may incur future debt and subsequently hinder 
technological improvement or the efficient use of resources given the lack of available finances. In 
periods of high debt, policymakers tend to rely on robust economic growth to ensure debt 
sustainability. However, when GDP falls, it becomes difficult for governments to raise sufficient 
revenues to repay debt service obligations.  
Over the years, researchers showed great interest in the relationship between debt and growth by 
using predominantly causality approaches (Scott, 1995; Amoateng and Amoako-Adu, 1996; 
Karagol, 2002). More recently, studies have sought to investigate the threshold level for the debt-
to-GDP ratio, which identifies the initial point of debt that causes output to fall. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010), whose work has captivated much attention, alluded to debt ratios beyond 
90 percent as detrimental to economic improvement while Caner et al. (2010) proposed a much 
lower 77 percent. These studies focused on a combination of developed and developing countries 
from various regions but failed to concentrate on a particular geographical area.  
In this article, countries from only the Caribbean community (CARICOM) are investigated since 
empirical findings tend to vary among nations with structural and economic differences. Therefore, 
the results from this paper should provide a more centered analysis of the community. Unlike 
previous research, the study also gives a complete view of public debt over various ratios to GDP 
and its impact on economic growth. In light of the recent global financial crisis, the paper is very 
timely as CARICOM governments have made public debt one of its top priorities as they aim to 
reduce the debt levels and improve productivity. Therefore, policy-makers such as central bankers, 
regulators and supervisors can better understand the role of debt in the economy and identify when 
debt begins to get too excessive. 
                                                 
1 Positive growth can be achieved when countries with low stocks of capital use the borrowed funds for productive 
investment.  
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In this paper, along with the threshold estimation technique outlined by Hansen (1996, 2000), a 
new approach is utilised and adopted to a growth model specifically designed for the Caribbean 
community. The new method is a regression approach that allows one to see the impact of public 
debt on economic growth as the debt to GDP ratios vary over a pre specified range. This approach 
gives a relatively complete view of public debt ratios dynamics on economic growth and the other 
determinants of economic growth. The findings suggested a debt threshold of about 56 percent of 
GDP and showed that debt under 30 percent of GDP is beneficial for the economies. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of the historical 
behavior of public debt in the Caribbean. Section 3 examines the theoretical and empirical 
literature, with a focus on economic growth theory. Section 4 outlines the methodological 
approach and the data employed in the study, while section 5 discusses the estimated results. 
Section 6 summarizes the main findings of the paper as well as provides the key policy 
implications of the threshold analysis for decision-makers. 
II.   THE HISTORICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC DEBT  
Increasing trends exist in the nominal debts of all the 12 selected CARICOM countries during the 
review period of 1990 to 2010. Most of these economies witnessed sustained expansions in debt 
over the entire two decades with exceptions being Suriname, whose debt level plateau after 1994 
and Guyana where significant fluctuations are noticeable (see Table 1 and Figure 1).  
Nominal debt levels ranged from U.S$130 million to US$15,055 million recorded for Dominica 
and Jamaica, respectively. The average debt levels of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union 
(ECCU)2 states and Suriname are remarkably less than those of the other nations. The combined 
averages of the aforementioned countries equate to about 28 percent of the average debt of 
Jamaica.  
Specifically for Grenada, St. Lucia, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, during the early and 
mid 2000s the increases in debt slowed. However, decreases were noticed in the cases of 
Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica. Markedly, it is very clear that during the recessionary years 
of 2008–2010 nominal debt in these CARICOM territories continued on an upward trajectory with 
the only exception being Antigua and Barbuda that have engaged in debt restructuring. The 
volatility, measured by the standard deviation, of nominal debt levels of the fixed exchange rate 
countries to the U.S. dollar (Barbados, Bahamas, and the ECCU states) range from US$42 to 
US$534 while that of the managed floating exchange rate countries are much greater (Jamaica 
US$2900 and Trinidad US$2400).  
Similarly, rising trends also exist for the real debt levels of these nations excluding Jamaica 
(Table 2 and Figure 2). The Jamaican data suggested that their price level increased much faster 
than their debt. The average levels of debt to nominal gross domestic product for the countries 
                                                 
2 The ECCU states include: Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
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                                  Table 1. Summary Statistics for Nominal Public Debt 
 
ANTIGUA BAHAMAS BARBADOS DOMINICA GRENADA GUYANA JAMAICA ST KITTS ST LUCIA ST VINCENT SURINAME TRINIDAD
 Mean 679.3 1311.2 1489.7 145.8 235.0 1500.9 7663.0 349.9 252.6 192.3 1174.4 4371.1
 Median 726.6 1152.6 1254.5 123.0 137.8 1467.9 5528.6 258.3 172.6 135.8 569.8 3055.2
 Maximum 1224.9 3520.3 4134.2 272.0 674.3 2120.0 15055.4 817.4 608.4 377.7 9390.9 11057.0
 Minimum 355.6 243.1 246.6 10.7 23.8 835.0 3178.9 85.9 24.8 49.5 145.3 1187.0
 Std. Dev. 248.3 863.8 998.2 88.1 207.2 338.4 3866.3 259.4 208.2 113.6 1937.4 2773.6
 Skewness 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 3.5 1.0
 Kurtosis 2.1 2.9 3.3 1.6 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 14.8 2.9
 Jarque-Bera 1.0 3.5 5.3 2.9 5.9 0.6 4.4 2.4 3.4 2.5 187.4 5.1
 Probability 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
 Observations 22 31 31 31 31 31 31 21 30 25 24 31  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Nominal Public Debt levels of selected CARICOM States 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Real Public Debt   
 
ANTIGUA BAHAMAS BARBADOS DOMINICA GRENADA GUYANA JAMAICA ST KITTS ST LUCIA ST VINCENT SURINAME TRINIDAD
 Mean 721.9 1475.6 1673.0 159.3 256.5 2567.1 64290.0 358.2 386.6 199.6 367832.3 6483.1
 Median 783.2 1349.8 1595.2 142.9 175.1 1815.9 16305.7 299.7 336.3 149.3 1482.9 6815.6
 Maximum 1155.6 3103.8 3123.2 283.2 584.5 8956.6 234115.6 689.3 676.9 370.6 1525501.0 8152.3
 Minimum 441.2 586.5 633.6 22.3 56.5 873.9 7864.3 134.2 148.7 77.8 406.9 4459.2
 Std. Dev. 207.2 654.5 659.9 75.1 173.3 1909.3 73523.0 205.9 175.2 92.7 596442.8 1116.3
 Skewness 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.9 1.9 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.0 -0.4
 Kurtosis 2.0 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.2 6.9 2.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.1
 Jarque-Bera 1.0 2.6 1.4 1.7 4.9 26.8 6.1 2.4 2.1 2.2 5.0 2.0
 Probability 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4
 Observations 22 31 31 31 31 21 31 21 21 25 24 31  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Real Public Debt for selected CARICOM States 
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under analysis present themselves in two distinct bands (Table 3 and Figure 3). The debt bands 
average around 48 percent and 98 percent of nominal gross domestic product. St. Kitts and Nevis 
has the largest debt ratio of 140 percent in 2006, 2007 and 2009 while Suriname holds the 
minimum of 18 percent in 2008. The data trends downward throughout the latter 1900s and early 
2000s, followed by a general upward movement toward the end of the sample period. Interestingly, 
all the countries except Suriname showcase a shock to this ratio during the recessionary period of 
2008 to 2010 irrespective of the trends observed previously. Notably, there is not a high level of 
volatility for this ratio over this period.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Public Debt to Gross Domestic Product Ratios of 
Selected CARICOM States  
 
ANTIGUA BAHAMAS BARBADOS DOMINICA GRENADA GUYANA JAMAICA ST KITTS ST LUCIA ST VINCENT SURINAME TRINIDAD
 Mean 97.4 28.8 64.7 63.0 63.0 264.6 119.7 99.4 38.0 56.0 210.5 48.4
 Median 94.9 28.8 63.0 58.7 55.2 207.3 116.6 97.6 31.1 56.4 44.5 54.6
 Maximum 127.5 46.7 129.1 103.5 107.4 585.1 227.2 159.9 65.3 67.2 2157.8 67.3
 Minimum 76.9 18.2 28.7 18.2 28.4 59.6 75.0 47.9 16.3 41.3 16.9 18.6
 Std. Dev. 14.0 6.9 20.6 18.5 22.1 149.8 33.7 42.4 17.2 7.3 471.7 15.3
 Skewness 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.5 -0.6 3.3 -0.8
 Kurtosis 3.0 3.0 4.5 3.4 2.4 2.2 4.9 1.4 1.6 2.8 13.4 2.4
 Jarque-Bera 2.9 1.5 6.9 0.8 3.7 2.1 13.2 2.3 3.5 1.3 150.9 4.1
 Probability 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1
 Observations 22 31 31 31 31 31 31 21 30 21 24 31  
 
 
Figure 3. Public Debt to GDP Ratios of Selected CARICOM States  
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The average growth in the debt to gross domestic product ratio of the CARICOM states studied 
was 6.3 percent (Table 4 and Figure 4). The fastest increase was observed in St. Kitts (12 percent) 
while the lowest was Guyana (-2 percent). The growth rate of this ratio appears to be highly 
volatile and fluctuated between a minimum of -39 percent and 54 percent in Suriname and 
Grenada, respectively. In general, the debt variables and ratios exhibit no serious non-normality 
problems, which allows for the interpretation of the standard errors using the central limit theorem.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for the Growth in the Public Debt to GDP Ratio  
 
ANTIGUA BAHAMAS BARBADOS DOMINICA GRENADA GUYANA JAMAICA ST KITTS ST LUCIA ST VINCENT SURINAME TRINIDAD
 Mean 0.3 3.4 5.5 6.2 5.5 -0.7 0.7 5.9 5.2 3.0 8.5 4.4
 Median -2.5 3.4 5.3 0.8 0.8 -1.8 -2.2 8.0 3.6 2.7 -2.4 -1.4
 Maximum 32.5 16.2 26.4 109.4 51.2 50.9 48.1 19.6 24.7 42.5 147.2 97.5
 Minimum -22.5 -11.7 -8.2 -12.6 -11.5 -49.5 -28.8 -14.1 -7.6 -21.0 -97.9 -30.1
 Std. Dev. 11.7 6.8 8.5 22.5 15.5 19.6 16.9 9.5 8.1 12.4 48.4 22.7
 Skewness 0.8 -0.2 0.7 3.4 1.4 0.0 0.9 -0.4 0.5 1.1 0.6 2.5
 Kurtosis 4.3 2.3 3.4 16.0 4.7 4.2 3.8 2.1 2.7 5.9 4.8 10.8
 Jarque-Bera 3.8 0.8 2.6 270.8 14.0 1.7 5.0 1.3 1.5 13.8 4.3 106.7
 Probability 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0
 Observations 21 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 29 24 22 30  
 
 
Figure 4. Growth of the Public Debt to GDP Ratio  
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III.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theoretical literature suggests that there is a nonlinear relationship between debt and growth 
through various channels such as private savings, public investment, total factor productivity, 
interest rates, inflation, and capital accumulation. One of the most important factors is investment. 
It is generally accepted that smaller and/or less developed economies are likely to be resource-
constrained, and if borrowed capital is used for productive investment, higher growth rates can be 
attained (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). However, several theories attest to the growth-reducing 
effect debt can have above a certain threshold (Cordella et al., 2005; Caner et al., 2010). The 
economy can suffer from debt overhang: after a certain point the debt level serves as a disincentive 
for investors, who believe their profits will be heavily taxed so that the government is able to 
service its relatively large and growing stock of debt. This has negative implications for economic 
growth. There is also the liquidity/budget constraint hypothesis, which proposes that debt service 
limits the amount of funds at government’s disposal that can be used for investment purposes that 
could increase economic activity. In addition, some of the literature suggests that rising debt levels 
simply increase investors’ uncertainty about government policies and actions and therefore 
discourages investment (Clements et al., 2003).  
In terms of the empirical literature, it appears that for the estimation of a prudential debt limit with 
regards to growth, the more common approaches include the use of histograms, spline functions 
and threshold estimations. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), utilizing histograms formed from two 
centuries of data for 44 countries, discovered a weak link between growth and debt up until a 
‘tipping point’ of 90 percent of central government debt to GDP, beyond which debt restricts 
growth. A lower threshold of 60 percent was found for external debt (government plus private) to 
GDP of emerging market economies. Using the perhaps more rigorous threshold estimation 
techniques developed by Hansen (1996, 2000), Caner et al. (2010) estimated a much lower 
threshold– an average of 77 percent for public debt to GDP for both developed and developing 
countries, and an even lower threshold (64 percent) when the estimations are conducted for 
emerging markets alone. Cordella et al. (2005), employing spline functions and the threshold 
estimation techniques of Hansen (1996, 2000), also identified debt tipping points of between  
15–30 percent for countries with good policies and institutions (non-Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs), and 0-20 percent for economies without HIPCs).  
Some studies estimate a threshold for external debt alone. For example, Pattillo et al. (2002) 
applying spline functions found that the average impact of external debt on per capita growth 
becomes negative above 35–40 percent of GDP, and that the marginal effect is negative at about 
half these levels. Similarly, Clements et al. (2003) located a threshold at approximately 50 percent 
of nominal external debt to GDP, and 20–25 percent for the net present value of external debt to 
GDP.  
Much of the work on the debt-growth link has been for developed and developing countries. There 
has been comparatively less focus on the Caribbean region where there are 5 of the world’s 
13 most indebted nations. Most of the older Caribbean studies (for example, Blackman, 1988 and 
Boamah, 1989) tended to be more descriptive when assessing the debt-growth link in the 
Caribbean. One of the more dated research which performed some empirical testing is that by 
Holder and Prescod (1991), who followed the neoclassical approach and linearly specify income 
growth as dependent on the savings rate, export growth (a proxy for technological change), debt 
growth, and wages corrected for productivity. They found that debt had a negative effect on 
income growth in Barbados.  
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Also assuming a linear relationship is Caldentey (2007) who examined the consequences of debt 
for growth in CARICOM, using a scatter plot and regression analysis. A negative relationship is 
said to exist between these two variables, possibly through increasing uncertainty, crowding out of 
investment and the effects of debt overhang on rates of return. The author also suggested that with 
the accumulation of debt, the focus of economic policy and institutions shifts from the 
development of the real sector to debt management. In another recent study by Schclarek and 
Ramon-Ballester (2005), there is both a linear and nonlinear estimation of the relationship between 
external debt and economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, using a dynamic system 
GMM panel estimator. They also find an inverse relationship, but no evidence of nonlinearity. 
Branch and Adderley (2007) came to the same conclusion in their study of national debt and 
economic growth of The Bahamas, which also postulated a linear specification. Most of the 
research for the Caribbean which assumed a linear specification has therefore found that debt is 
negatively related to economic growth. 
One of the studies that found non-linearity was that by Boamah and Moore (2009) who used a 
standard neo-classical growth model to examine the relationship between external debt and growth 
in the Caribbean. They added to the external debt to GDP variable, an interaction term between 
debt and policy, where the debt variable enters the term in quadratic form. The study utilised the 
two-stage least squares estimator, augmented with country specific and time dummies to correct 
for endogeneity of the debt variable. It is found that external debt is positively related to economic 
growth in a good policy environment (low inflation, manageable fiscal positions and open trade 
policies). However, above a threshold of 63 percent debt is growth-reducing, regardless of the type 
of the policy environment. 
A strand of research, closely related to the issue of threshold effects and economic growth, is that 
of debt sustainability and identifying a maximum sustainable debt ratio. In fact it can be argued 
that the existence of a debt threshold as it pertains to growth would imply that this is the point 
beyond which debt become unsustainable. IMF (2003) addressed this issue using a number of 
interesting approaches. First they estimated fiscal policy reaction functions, where a positive 
response of the primary balance to debt indicates that the policy stance will allow for long-run 
solvency. They found that for emerging economies the response of the primary balance stops when 
debt surpasses 50 percent of GDP, compared to a threshold of 80 percent for industrial countries. 
The paper also employed a methodology that seeks to determine whether a government is “over 
borrowing”, that is, if the existing debt stock is more than the present discounted value of future 
primary balances. Assuming that the past is the best indicator of future policy action, the average 
of historical primary balances was used as an estimate of expected primary balances, so that a 
benchmark debt-to-GDP ratio could be calculated. This benchmark level was found to be 
25 percent for emerging markets and 75 percent for industrial economies. Finally, the paper 
considers uncertainties governments may face, in particular with respect to revenues earned; 
variability in revenues – especially when revenues are low for a long period – can impact debt 
sustainability. IMF (2003) conducted simulations for ‘typical” emerging market and industrial 
countries and found that countries with a lower and more volatile revenue base, less ability to 
adjust expenditures, as well as greater disparity between the real interest and growth rates, are able 
to sustain lower debt levels. As with the other approaches used, it was found that emerging 
economies are able to sustain a lower ratio than more advanced countries. 
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Apart from considering the point at which debt starts to negatively affect economic growth, and 
the formal debt sustainability methods, there are other various approaches to identifying a debt 
threshold, as noted by Bannister and Barrot (2011). There are those that consider the impact on the 
external balances, while some examine the efficacy of fiscal policy at various debt levels. In 
addition there is the debt intolerance approach by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), where the Institutional Investor Rating (the measure of intolerance) is 
regressed on the debt ratio, default history and inflation. Bannister and Barrot (2011) revised this 
procedure by addressing some of the methodological issues. In particular, they employed a 
dynamic panel approach, accounted for endogeneity in the regressors, and based the calculation of 
debt thresholds on credit ratings of major rating agencies, which are more objective criteria. They 
are then able to rank Central America, Panama, and Dominican Republic countries by level of debt 
intolerance. 
IV.   METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The following threshold least square regression model is adopted:  
 
            (1) 
where yit is real GDP growth, Xit is a matrix of controls as discussed in the previous section, Dit is 
public debt as a percent of GDP, and  is the debt-to-GDP threshold, thus )( *DDit  is an 
indicator function. On the choice of control variables, it is noted that quite a wide range of 
variables have been used in growth empirics; however a number of these, such as ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (from Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b; Easterly and Levine, 1997) and assassinations 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000), are not applicable to the Caribbean. The choice of variables used here 
is arrived at by a survey of the literature as it relates to developing countries, in particular work 
done on the Caribbean3 region. There are fiscal policy, openness to international trade, inflation, 
government expenditure, investment and the population growth rate. To account for omitted 
variable bias and reverse causality the initial level of GDP per capita is included in the set of 
control variables.4 In addition, the model is estimated with fixed effects using cross-section 
weights to take care of country heterogeneity. The time-fixed effects are not incorporated due to 
the low level of degrees of freedom. The White cross-section method is employed to account for 
cross-equation correlation.  
Given the small size of the panel employed here, where there are only 12 countries with annual 
data of 20 years, and the need to derive the threshold levels in a non arbitrary way, the study 
commence   at 22 percent and increase it by 1 percent up to 110 percent. This range covers 
                                                 
3 Specifically, works by Williams and Daniel (1991), the World BankError! Bookmark not defined. (1994), Boamah 
(1997), Lewis and Craigwell (1998), Peters (2001), and Downes (2003). Note that a wider review of the literature on 
these variables is contained in Greenidge (2006). 
4 This is a common approach in the literature; see for example Caner et al. (2010).  
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approximately 85 percent of the distribution. Next the estimated relationships are graphed and 
conclusion derived. This approach gives a relatively complete view of the debt ratios dynamics on 
growth and the other determinants of growth and is quite informative. However, it does not allow 
for an accurate assessment of the statistical significance of the thresholds by providing confidence 
intervals.  
To overcome such a problem, Hansen (1996, 2000) threshold framework is estimated as follows: 
 
      (2) 
where D* is the threshold level of debt as a percent of GDP and I is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one for debt level greater than D* and zero otherwise. Depending on the actual level 
of debt one of the first two terms in the model specification will drop out of the regression thus 
allowing for thresholds effects. When the debt is below the threshold, γ1 is estimated. When it is 
above the threshold, γ2 is estimated. Since D* is unknown, the model is again estimated with a 
threshold search over the range 22 to 112 percent in increments of 0.1 percent. Thus, debt 
threshold among the following values of D*: {22%, 22.1%, 22.2% … 112%} is searched for; a 
total of 900 regressions. The optimal level of threshold is chosen based on the standard errors of 
each individual parameter. 
However, as noted by Hansen (2000), under the hull hypothesis of no threshold  classical 
tests have non-standard distributions and therefore are not appropriate for econometric inferences. 
Hansen (1996, 2000) recommended a bootstrap technique to simulate the empirical distribution of 
the following likelihood ratio test statistic: 
             
where S0 and S1(D*) are the sums of squared residuals (SSR) under H0:  D* = 0, and H1: D* ≠ 0 
respectively; and σ2 is the residual variance under H1. Thus, S0 is SSR without a threshold effect 
and S1(D*) is SSR with a threshold effect of Equation (2). 
The study used annual data ranging from 1980 to 2010 for 12 CARICOM countries: Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The variables 
public debt, gross domestic product, exports, imports, investment and government expenditure 
were converted to millions of U.S. dollars and expressed as a ratio of nominal gross domestic 
product. The variables employed were obtained from various sources and are statistically 
summarized in Table 4. Openness proxied by imports and exports is utilised in this study to 
account for the strong trade linkages between the Caribbean countries, and the U.S. and the U.K.  
V.   RESULTS 
The results from Equation (1), illustrated in Figures 5 to 9, suggest that there are threshold effects 
in the relationship between public debt and economic growth. The threshold impacts appear at 30 
percent and 56 percent of debt to GDP levels (see Table 5 and Figure 5). When debt as a share of 
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GDP is lower than the threshold value of 30 percent, increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio up to the 
threshold value are associated with faster economic growth of roughly 0.41 percentage points.5 
Small or less developed economies, such as those in CARICOM, tend to be resource-constrained, 
and so capital accessed through borrowing can be used to boost investment and allow higher 
growth rates to be achieved.  
As the debt-to-GDP ratio rises above the 30 percent threshold value, the effect on growth is still 
positive but is now much less and also statistically insignificant. As the debt levels continue to rise, 
another threshold appears at 56 percent of GDP, where the growth effects switch from positive to 
negative as debt becomes a drag on growth. This threshold exists for one or more reasons. At this 
point the economy may begin to suffer from debt overhang; this level of debt discourages 
investment as investors believe that their profits will be taxed away in order to service the debt, 
and this hinders economic expansion. Alternatively, or at the same time, higher debt-servicing 
costs associated with higher debt levels, constrain the amount of funds available for public 
investment that can boost growth. In addition, the possibility exists that increasing debt levels 
heighten investors’ uncertainty about government policies and therefore acts as a disincentive to 
investment. 
The lower debt threshold value of 30 percent also appears to be important for the impact of 
investment on economic growth (see Table 6 and Figure 6). At debt levels below 30 percent of 
GDP, investment has a positive and significant impact on growth. As the debt levels increase about 
this threshold value, the positive investment effect on growth diminishes and becomes statistically 
insignificant. A similar pattern exists for trade openness, except that the tipping point is a debt 
level of 34 percent of GDP (see Figure 7). At debt levels below this threshold, greater openness to 
trade has a positive impact of growth, while the effects are insignificant once debt levels exceed 
the threshold.  
 
Table 5. Threshold Debt Regression using the Modified Hansen Model 
 
Least Square Two-Stage LS
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
1 0.127 0.051 0.123 0.072
2 -0.082 0.015 -0.080 0.000
Initial GDP per capita -0.159 0.052 -0.176 0.008
Openness 0.004 0.139 0.004 0.139
Inflation -0.003 0.071 -0.003 0.070
Investment to GDP(%) 0.06 0.017 0.053 0.002
Government Expenditure to GDP (%) -0.126 0.036 -0.146 0.001
D* 54.7  55.8  
R-squared 0.457  0.448  
 
 
                                                 
5 This is the average of the debt coefficients between 22 and 29 percent levels of debt to GDP.  
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Figure 5. Public Debt and Growth 
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Table 6. Estimated Loss in Real GDP Growth  
(In Percentage Points) 
 
  
Annual 
percentage point 
loss in real GDP 
growth 
Cumulated loss since 
1980 in percentage points 
of real GDP growth 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 3.31 102.59 
The Bahamas n/a n/a 
Barbados 1.65 32.98 
Dominica 1.12 23.38 
Grenada 1.59 25.37 
Guyana 16.76 519.70 
Jamaica 5.22 161.97 
St. Kitts and Nevis 5.46 76.46 
St. Lucia 0.51 4.62 
St. Vincent 0.37 5.50 
Suriname 53.74 322.43 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.42 6.26 
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Figure 6. Investment and Growth 
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Figure 7. Trade and Growth 
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Government expenditure has a negative impact on growth, however its effects only becomes 
significant once debt exceeds 47 percent of GDP (see Figure 8). Beyond this threshold, every 
10 percentage points increase in the debt ratio slows growth, via the government spending channel, 
by an average of 0.4 percentage points. As debt builds up, the associated interest expense increases 
government expenditure and therefore limits the amount of government resources that can be spent 
on productive projects. The inflation-growth effect is also dependent on the 47 percent threshold 
(see Figure 9). At debt levels below this threshold, inflation has a negative impact on growth, 
while above the threshold the effects are insignificant. 
Threshold estimation from Equation (2) yields a threshold value of 54.7 percent. The 
corresponding sums of squared residuals as a function of the debt threshold are depicted in Figure 
10. The bootstrap estimation for the significance of threshold estimates suggests that the threshold 
estimate is highly significant (p-value 0.002)6. The model is re-estimated with the corresponding 
threshold and the results are shown in Table 5 and are consistent with the above analysis. The 
coefficient on 1 is positive and significant suggesting that debt level lower than 54.7 percent of 
GDP is associated with positive economic growth. However, the coefficient 2 is negative and 
significant, which implies that once the debt rises above this threshold the relationship between 
debt and growth becomes negative. Moreover, if debt exceeds this level, each additional 
percentage point in the ratio of public debt to GDP costs approximately 0.08 percentage points in 
annual average economic growth.  
Figure 8. Government Spending and Growth 
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6 The Eviews programs for the threshold estimation and bootstrapping can be obtained from the authors.  
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Figure 9. Inflation and Growth 
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Figure 10. Sum of Squared Residuals as a Function of Debt Threshold  
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To put the 54.7 percent threshold in to perspective, consider Table 6 which shows the annual 
average percentage point loss in real GDP growth as a result of exceeding the threshold. It also 
depicts the cumulative loss over the period 1980 to 2010 for exceeding and staying above the 
threshold for extended periods. The calculations suggest that it is very costly for countries to 
exceed the threshold for an extended period of time. For example, Barbados’ public debt level rose 
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above this threshold in 1991 and continued to increase since then to reach roughly 129 percent of 
GDP in 2010. The evidence suggest that this cost the country approximately 1.65 percentage 
points in real GDP growth per annum, equivalent to 32.98 percentage points loss over the 1991 to 
2010 period.  
Finally, as part of the robustness check of the results, we revisited the issue of causality. Although 
the initial level of GDP per capita is included to control for omitted variable bias and reverse 
causality, it may be argued that such an approach does not fully correct for endogeneity. Thus, 
equation 2 is also estimated using two stage least squares and employing the first lags as 
instruments (see Table 5, column 2; the sum of squares residuals are in Figure 11). The resulting 
threshold is slightly higher, at 55.8 percent of GDP and the remaining estimates are similar to the 
least square ones.  
Figure 11: Sum of Squared Residuals with Instruments 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the debt literature by identifying the effects different levels of debt-to-
GDP ratios have on economic growth rates. The study adopted the threshold estimation approach 
as described by Hansen (1996, 2000) and a variant thereof. The findings validated the notions that 
emerging markets face lower thresholds of debt-to-GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) and that high 
levels of debt, especially for low income or developing countries, can have adverse effects on 
growth levels. The results indicated that debt contributes positively to growth when it is below 
30 percent of GDP but becomes a main concern for output beyond 55 percent of GDP. Moreover, 
between 30 and 55 percent of GDP the marginal impact of debt diminishes, where the contribution 
to growth from each additional increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases up to the 55 percent 
threshold, and then turns negative (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12. Stylized Shape of the Threshold Effects of Public Debt on Growth 
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The logical conclusion is that countries with debt ratios above 55 percent should aim to achieve 
debt- to-GDP levels that do not impede growth by adopting polices that put debt on a trajectory 
towards the 55 percent threshold. Governments should also target debt levels that are well below 
the estimated thresholds to cater for recessionary periods of the business cycle or events such as 
natural disasters that affect capital stock. Compared to Reinhart and Rogoff, (2010) and Caner et 
al. (2010), a much lower threshold was found for the Caribbean region because of its small size 
and lack of physical resources (excludes Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago). Most of the countries 
in the community rely significantly on tourism and have underdeveloped capital markets, which 
makes the economies much more vulnerable to external shocks. 
Since emerging/developing markets have been identified to have a much more binding debt 
threshold than developed countries, and given that most of the countries under investigations 
currently have high debt-to-GDP ratios that are above the suggested turning point threshold, it is 
critical for governments to engage in fiscal consolidation. However, with lingering effects from the 
current recession, including higher unemployment levels due to a long, slow recovery, 
consolidation of the fiscal balances would become more difficult. Therefore, in order to achieve 
faster and sustained growth paths, government, in conjunction with the private sector, need to 
present more innovative ideas and rehash some of the current policies for the region.  
One suggestion would be to focus on improving trade through CARICOM or the Caribbean Single 
Market and Economy (CSME). The economic union can be used for cost savings through scale 
economies, for example, integrating the activities of financial supervision and regulation. 
Additionally, greater progress is needed in the areas of information technology and renewable 
energy production. Since Caribbean countries are net importers of oil products, with the exception 
of Trinidad and Tobago, the region is likely to benefit from lower import bills if swift action is 
taken to provide better incentives for the usage of renewable energy. 
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